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Abstract: We can never be sure anyone else is sentient. But we can be sure enough in the 
case of other people, nonhuman primates, mammals, birds, fish, lower vertebrates and 
invertebrates as to make scepticism academic and otiose (not to mention monumentally 
cruel). The only genuinely uncertain kinds of cases are jellyfish, microbes and plants. The 
rest is not about whether but what they are feeling. 
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The only substantive points on which I might disagree with Tim Racine (2016) are all in his 
second paragraph: 
 
1.  Racine criticizes the “Cartesian split between mind and behavior.” But having a 
mind just means having mental states. Mental states just means felt states. And 
feeling is not the same thing as doing (behavior). So there is indeed a split between 
feeling and doing. 
 
2.  Racine suggests that “there is no certainty per se in the first person case.” I think 
there certainly is. I can be certain that I am feeling whatever I am feeling when I am 
feeling it. It is only others who cannot be certain I am feeling anything (and I, that 
others are feeling anything). So I do indeed assume that “we can only be sure about 
our own minds but have to rely on inference for the minds of others”: inference from 
what they (and their brains) do as well as from what they say (if they can talk). So we 
can’t be sure others are feeling. But we can be sure enough in the case of other 
people, other primates, other mammals, birds, fish, lower vertebrates and 
invertebrates as to make scepticism academic and otiose (not to mention 
monumentally cruel). The only genuinely uncertain kinds of cases are jellyfish, 
microbes and plants. The rest is not about whether but what they are feeling. 
 
3.  I don’t know what “mental concepts” are, so I don’t know what it would mean that 
although they “essentially involve feelings, many do not.” If the “many” refers to 
mental states (rather than to “mental concepts,” whatever that might mean) then all 
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mental states are felt states, hence “essentially involve feelings.” If what is meant by 
“mental concepts” is states like thinking something, believing something, knowing 
something, understanding something, meaning something, etc. then, yes, those are 
felt states too, whilst I’m actually thinking, believing, knowing, understanding, or 
meaning something. It feels like something to think, believe, know, understand or 
mean that today is Tuesday. I never had much of a feel for philosophers’ “non-
occurrent beliefs” such as my (now occurrent, but a moment ago non-occurrent) 
belief that today is Tuesday. It feels like something to be believing that today is 
Tuesday when I’m actually believing it. At other times I would call that information 
that is encoded in my brain; information I am likely to consult, if asked. That would 
make it previously an “offline” cerebral state but not a felt one, hence not a mental 
one, until it came “online” and I felt it. But because both happen in the brain, 
confusion is invited… 
 
Or perhaps by “mental concepts” Racine means our concepts about the nature of 
mental states. Well, it certainly feels like something to be having concepts (beliefs, 
etc.) about the nature of mental states, although many of those concepts today are 
still murky. On concepts about whether and what mental states others might be in, 
see (2) above. 
 
4.  Racine writes: “whereas we have a pretty good sense of what people mean when 
they claim they know what an object feels like, it is less clear what a felt mental state 
consists of (other than typically being accompanied by a verbal report or 
characteristic pattern of behavior as in other mental states).” Well we know a bit 
more than that. If someone says or acts as if they feel an itch, we have a pretty good 
sense of what they mean (if they are telling the truth). And it does not mean “a verbal 
report or characteristic pattern of behavior.” It means what it feels like to feel an 
itch. Ditto for believing that today is Tuesday.   
 
The rest of Racine’s commentary seems to agree that we can indeed often correctly infer 
whether another organism is sentient, and even what it is feeling and thinking, though not 
with certainty. Our own language, thinking and reasoning of course play a role in this mind-
reading capacity, as do our observational skills, felt experiences and perhaps even our 
“mirror neurons” (whatever – if anything – they may be doing to generate our telepathic 
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